Public Economics: Summary#

Table of Contents


Study of Government in our Economy

Main Questions

  1. When should Government intervene?

  2. How?

  3. What is the Effect?

  4. Why do politicians intervene the way they do?

Government Expenditure#

Wagners Law: Government expenditure grows not only in absolute terms, but also in relative to overall economy

Reasons:

  • Fiscal Illusions

  • Urbanization

  • superior goods by Gov

  • Baumol

  • Demographic

Baumol Effect: Services = more expensive than goods, Gov provides many services

Theory of Welfare Economics#

Demand#

  • with indifference curves of Utility Levels

  • and budget constraint

img

Marginal Utility: increment in utility with one additional unit of good (diminishing)

Marginal Rate of Substitution: Willingness to trade one good for another = Slope of IDC

Price Change Effects: Substitution / Income Effect

Elasticity of Demand: % change in demand due to 1% increase in price

\[ e = \frac{ \frac{ \Delta Q }{Q} }{\frac{ \Delta P }{P}} \]
  • often negative

  • if infinite = perfectly elastic demand (horizontal)

  • if 0 = perfectly unelastic (vertical)

Demand for Good at Price: derived from multiple Budget Constraints

Supply#

Supply Curve = outcome of profit maximization

  • Production Function \(q = \sqrt{K * L}\)

  • Profit maximization at short term: \(p = MC\)

Equilibrium#

img

Social Surplus = net gains from trade in society

  • Consumer Surplus = \(\Delta\) Utility and Price

  • Producer Surplus = \(\Delta\) Production Cost and Price

Theorems of Welfare Economics

Theorem 1: competetive Equilibrium (where supply = demand) maximizes social efficiency

Theorem 2: society can attain efficient outcome by suitably redistributing resources among individuals + free trade

only under specific conditions!

Empirical Tools#

Correlation vs possible flows of causation

  • A -> B

  • B -> A

  • C -> A & B (third factor)

Bias: source of difference between groups, that is correlated with treatment but not due to t

solved with random assignment in groups

Randomized Control Trials#

2 random groups (treatment & placebo)

Problems

  • external validity: to other contexts

  • attrition: reduction of sample size over time (threat to internal validity)

  • Expense

Observational Data#

Time Series Analysis: Correlation over Time

  • no spearation of correlation / causation

  • excluded variables

Cross Sectional Regression: statistical magic

  • add control variables for better results

  • regression line for showing

quasi-experiments: change in economic environment create nearly identical groups

  • often used in Difference in Difference (DiD) Models

  • have to argument that bias is not relevant in this context

structural modelling: Estimation of Policy Effect on individual decisions (e.g income effects)

  • structural estimation

  • reduced form estimates

Externalities#

externality: indirect cost / benefit to uninvolved third party

  • type of market failure

  • positive / negative

  • production / consumption based

    • consumption: individuals consumptions harms others

    • production: firms production harms others

= create difference between Social Marginal Cost and Private Marginal Cost

Private Marginal Cost (PMC): direct cost to produce one good

Social Marginal Cost (SMC): PMC + costs imposed on others

Example: img

Solution => internalize Externalities

Private Sector Solution#

Coase Theorem: well defined property rights + negotiations => socially optimal market quantity

damaged can demand compensation from damager

  • does not depend on who owns rights (either damage payment or payment for not damaging)

  • Problems:

    • Assignment

    • Free Rider

    • Holdouts

    • Transaction Costs

img

=> only for specific problems!

Public Solutions#

Taxation / Subsidies = price Based approach

  • pigouvian taxes

  • align PMC and SMC

  • for low SMB of Reduction (Co2)

Regulation = quantity based approach

  • can be complicated

  • and inefficient

  • for high SMB of Reduction (nuclear leakage)

right amount of pollution:

img

Public Goods#

Types of Goods

Excludable

Non-excludable

rival

private good

club good

non-rival

common good

public good

Example: atmosphere as a sink for emissions

Provision: aggregate demands (vertically)

Problems with Public Provision of Goods

  • Crowd Out

  • Provision Mechanism

  • Measuring Costs / Benefites

  • Measuring Preferences

Cost-Benefit Analysis#

Measuring Costs#

  • Normal Costs (Capital, Operation, Maintenance)

  • Opportunity Costs (in imperfect markets)

Disocunting Future Costs to Present Discount Value $\( PDV = \frac{ F_1 }{1+r}+\frac{ F_2 }{(1+r)^2}+\frac{ F_3 }{(1+r)^3}+... \)\( for infinite: \)\frac{ cost_{per year} }{r}$

Measuring Benefits#

  • Time Savings Measuring

  • Live Saved Valuation

Methods:

  • Market Based = wages

  • survey based

  • revealed preferences

Example img

Issues#

  • Counting Mistakes

  • Menschenwürde

  • Uncertainty

  • Distribution Effects

Alternative: Cost Effectiveness Analysis

Asymmetric Information#

asymmetric Information: different actors have differing levels of information in market

Example: Insurance Market with low risk / high risk people

  • average price of insurance = too high for low risk, to cheap for others

  • low risk cannot proof they are low risk

=> market failure and adverse selection

market based solution: pooling equilibrium, separating equilibrium

Problems#

Adverse Selection: market situation where buyers and sellers have different information => unequal distribution of benefits to both parties

=> public insurance with mandatory (e.g Krankenkassen)

Moral Hazard: Adverse actions taben by individuals or producers in response to insurance against adverse outcomes

  • ex ante: changes in behavior that affect insured risk (smoking => lung cancer)

  • ex post: after risk has materialized (cancer => want every possible treatment)

=> only partial insurance, not full (e.g Arbeitslosengeld 1)

Inequality#

measureable in Income and Wealth

Graphical Representation:

Lorenz Curve

Gini Coefficient

img

2024-03-18_13-22-36

Equity Effiency Tradeoff: Societal Decision between these two

  • Pareto Efficiency: one person better off without making other person worse off

  • Problem: tyranny of status quo

Social Welfare Function#

Aggregation of indivudal utilities in Society

Requirements:

  • indidividualistic

  • pareto criterion (higher W for pareto-superior distributions)

  • inequality aversion

=> no correct SWF!

Welfare Redistribution#

Program Characteristics:

  • Eligibility

    • Categorical: restricted to some demographic (e.g Kindergeld)

    • means-tested: restricted by income (e.g Wohngeld)

    • many are both: (e.g Bürgergeld)

  • Type

    • Cash Welfare

    • In-Kind (e,g freie Kita)

Leakage in Welfare Programs (Okuns Leaky Bucket)

  • Administrative Costs

  • Deadweight Loss of Taxation

  • moral hazard (of the poor)

Benefit Example $\( B = G-(\tau \times w \times h) \)$

  • G = maximum benefit

  • \(\tau\) = reduction rate

  • \(w\) = wage

  • \(h\)​ = hours worked

at \(\tau=0.5\)

img

Iron Triangle of Welfare (choose only 2)

  • encourage work

  • resdistribute more

  • lowe costs

Solutions (only partly)

  • Categorical welfare Systems (compensate for lack of earnings capacity, e.g disabled)

  • ordeal mechanisms (work requirements etc.)

  • outside option (higher minimum wage)

Taxation#

General#

Tax (German Law): cash payment without a specific return, mandatory for all

Tax (economics): compulsory levy without a (individual or group-specific) service in return

Goals:

  • generate Revenue

  • increase equity

  • change individual behavior

Effective Tax Rates on Income

img

Red = effective Tax, green = marginal tax

marginal tax rate: percentage of the next euro of taxable income paid

effective tax rate: percentage of total income paid

Fairness in Tax System:

  • Vertical equity: Strong shoulders pay more

  • Horizontal equity: similar individuals pay equal amounts

Haig Simons Principle#

taxable income = reflect ability to pay

=> deductions for life situations, e.g Pendlerpauschale

  • but deviations also existent, e.g deduction for charitable giving

  • to induce crowd in and consumer sovereignty

  • cost = lost gov revenue

Unit of Taxation#

on what income should taxes be levied? (Family, Marriage, Individual)

  • Individual

    • no equity across couples (with same aggregated income, but different shares)

    • but fair taxation for everybody

  • Family

    • income aggregated on family level and taxed

    • = marriage tax, because shared filing = more expensive

  • Marriage Splitting

    • income splitted on 2 members of marriage

    • and then taxed

    • disincentivizes work for poorer member of HH

Tax Incidence#

Three Rules

  1. Statutory Burden \(\neq\) economic burden

  2. side of the market = irrelevant

  3. party with inelastic supply = bear taxes

Economic Incidence: burden of taxation measured by change in resources available

statutory incidence: burden borne by party that sends check to gov.

inelastic demand

elastic demand

img

burden at consumers

burden at producers

gross price: market price

after-tax price: gross price - tax (if producer tax) or + tax (if consumer side)

General Equilibrium Tax Incidence#

until now: only partial equilibrium tax incidence (impact on one market)

General equilibrium tax incidence: Analysis that considers the effects on related markets of a tax imposed on one marke

depends on

  • long run / short run = shifting elasticities

    • capital in short run = fixed, bears burden

    • in long run = more volatile

  • tax scope = non-taxed substitutes

  • spill-over effects

    • income effect = lower real income

    • substitution effect

    • complementary effect = reduce consumption of complementary goods (e.g beer tax and snacknuts consumption)

Tax Inefficiency#

Tax System: Trade off between Equity & effiency

Tax = creates Deadweight Loss (DWL), depends on

  • Elasticities (higher elasticity = higher DWL)

  • Tax height

\[ DWL = \frac{ \epsilon_s \epsilon_d }{2 (\epsilon_s - \epsilon_d) } * \tau^2 * \frac{ Q }{P} \]

marginal DWL: increase in DWL per unit of taxation

Implications for Efficiency:

  • depends on preexisting distortions

  • progressive tax = higher DWL

  • smooth taxes > high short taxes

Optimal Taxation#

for Commodities: by Frank Ramsay: ratio of marginal DWL = marginal Revenue

Formula:

\[ \frac{ MDWL_i }{MR_i} = \lambda \]

ratio \(\lambda\) = should besame for all goods

Example

\[ \frac{ MDWL_A }{MR_A} > \frac{ MDWL_B }{MR_B} \]
  • increase taxation on B

  • lower on A

-> elasticity rule: good with higher elast. = lower tax

  • but not good for equity (caviar = high elast, wheat = low)

for Income:

  • total income in society = fixed

  • same utility function

  • After = everyone same income

Formula: \(\frac{ MU }{MR} = \lambda\) same for all (MR = marginal Revenue)

Debt#

Governemtn Debt: amount gov. borrowed on financial markets

government deficits / surplus: yearly increase / decrease

Types of gov. debt:

  • Explicit: official debt given out by the financial ministry

  • implicit: explicit + promised payouts in the future (e.g pensions etc.)

Calculation of implicit debt:

Present Discounted Value:

\[ PDV = \frac{ F_1 }{1+r}+\frac{ F_2 }{1+r}+... \]

but:

  • very hard to calculate

  • (heroic) assumptions about r and F

=> focus on explict debt!

Effects#

Short Run: Stabilization

  • Automatic stabilization: automaitc policies e.g unemployment insurance

  • Discretionary stabilisation: policy actions taken in response (e.g Gaspreisbremse)

= good for the economy

Long Run: Negative?

  • limited private capital investment

  • less economic growth due to less private investment

Reality:

  • depends on capital markets

  • and what the debt is used for…

=> evidence is inconclusive